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Distentio, Intentio, Attentio: 
Intentionality and Chaucer's Third Eye 
David Williams 
I n the fifth book of Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, Criseyde looks out from the 
enemy camp toward Troy and the lover she has betrayed and laments her situation in 
terms of great significance for the larger meaning of the poem: 
Prudence, alias, oon of thyne veen thre 
Me lakked alwey, er that I come here! 
On tyme ypassed wel rem cm bred me, 
And present tyme ek koud ich wel ise, 
But future tyme, er I was in the snare, 
Koude I nat sen; that causeth now my care (V, 744-49).1 
The triocular personification of the virtue of Prudence belongs to an iconographie 
tradition that links it to the concept of time, each eye representing one of the phases 
of time, one eye conceived as exclusively viewing the present, another the past, and 
still another, the future. The philosophic exploration of the concept of time in the 
Middle Ages is determined by Saint Augustine's famous meditation on it in the Con-
fessions in which he also adopts a triadic structure to analyse the nature of time. Time 
presents itself to the human spirit, according to Augustine, in three modes: we seize 
the sense of the present through our mind's "attention," the past through "preten-
tion," and the future through "intention."2 
The repetition throughout Chaucer's works of the word entente signals the con-
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ceptual centrality of theories of intentionality in his poetics. In the philosophical tra-
dition from which Chaucer often borrowed, the term had several applications, one of 
them crucial to the nominalist/realist controversy so vigorously debated in the four-
teenth century: "first intentions,n William of Ockham tells us, have to do with the 
way things really are—that is to say, with being—and are the business of metaphys-
ics; second intentions have to do with the way things exist in the mind—that is to 
say, with concepts and words—and are the business of logic.3 Before this fragmenta-
tion of intentionality, Saint Augustine had developed a theory of intention in order 
to understand the nature of time, and his formulation of that understanding turned 
out to be a highly existential one. Conceiving of the three phases of time as experi-
enced according to three operations of the mind (anima), Augustine matched the 
memory of the past with praeter-itio, the anticipation of the future with in-tentio, and 
the experience of the present with at-tentio, a term that indicated the human aware-
ness of all aspects of time as a living praesens in which both being and its intellectual 
comprehension were one. When Chaucer has Criseyde address Prudence and lament 
her lack of one of the Virtue's dimensions, he sets in motion a series of associations 
that deepen the resonance of the image and widen the thematic concerns of the nar-
rative. The philosophical concept of intention, the Augustinian theory of time, and 
die metaphor of three-eyed Prudence combine in Troäus and Criseyde, it is argued 
here, to reveal the poem's ultimate meaning as one deeply anchored in the philosoph-
ical realism of its author's Christian Neoplatonism. 
The early scholastic distinction between first intentions and second intentions 
seems to have been by and large a formal one behind which abided a concept of 
world and mind as harmonious entities. First intentions are always about things as 
they really exist outside of the mind, their being and essence; second intentions are 
always about things as they are known to die intellect and exist in the mind of the 
knower, their conceptualisation and representation. Ideally, since the human intellect 
"adequate«" reality, these two intentions correspond, and we can know things as they 
truly are. William of Ockham's use of this distinction to deepen the separation 
between metaphysics and logic and to establish the autonomy of the latter for the 
study of second intentions had the effect of fragmenting a series of former unities 
into now-familiar binarisms in which, after Ockham's time, the parts became increas-
ingly antagonistic to each other: mind/world, sign/signified, opinion/truth.4 The 
very nature of the nominalism which began to dominate in Ockham's day was based 
on the real existence of particulars opposed to the unreal existence of universale, or 
the view that only individual, particular things truly possess existence and that the 
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universal exists only in the mind as an abstract concept, that is, as nomen. The 
divorce of mind from world is obvious in this formulation. The idea that experience 
is the primary basis of understanding and that universale are merely the mental 
abstractions of the experience of individual things in the world gave to experience a 
privileged position in a new epistemological hierarchy. Given the necessary subjectiv-
ity of experience, the multitudinous linguistic representations erf* the "real" tended to 
relativise human understanding and destabilise truth.5 
More synthetic is Saint Augustine's employment of the term intentio in order to 
understand how human experience can convey a truth that logic fails to explain— 
that time is real even though a logical explanation of its simultaneous existence and 
non-existence is hard to devise: "What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, 
provided that nobody ask me; but if 1 am asked what it is and try to explain, I am 
baffled" (XI, 14). The essential distinction between Augustine's philosophical 
approach and that of the scholastics is that he seeks to understand paradox without 
dissolving it; the dialectics of the scholastics in contrast sought to reduce paradox to 
logical proposition. 
In Book XI of the Confessions, Augustine shifts his attention to the specific sub-
ject of time, initiating his analysis by using language as a symbol for time: the time-
lessness of God's creative Word in relation to the temporality of man's mimetic 
words. He structures the discussion by trying to come to terms with a number of 
conundrums about time posed by various schools of thought at various moments in 
history. The first is derived from Augustine's own former allegiance, the Manichean 
school, which he characterises as the "old man" who asks: What was God doing before 
he made heaven and earth? (XI, 10). Augustine recognises the polemical nature of the 
question and the series of problems that flow from it, and in response he asserts the 
important principle that divine time is beyond, but is the matrix of, human time; one 
is eternity, the other chronology. Human time "participates" in eternal rime and con-
tains within it traces (vestigia) of its origins,6 much as the many reflect the One in 
Neoplatonic thought. 
It is this concept of "participation" that helps to reveal Augustine's analysis of 
time as a realist theory, since it reflects generally the realist notion that particulars are 
derived from universale and that their existence is a participation in the universals 
from which they take their existence. Universals are eternal while particulars come 
into and go out of existence in time; time itself is one of these because it has a begin-
ning and an end. The realist credentials of such a theory are impeccable, since the 
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idea is taken direcdy from Plotinus who, in turn, is relying on Plato for his basic ori-
entation: eternity, claims Plotinus in the Enneads, is distinguished from time by the 
fact that it is of the nature of that which lasts forever, while time is of the nature of 
that which comes into existence in the sensible, material universe. Moreover, the best 
way to understand time is to begin with its static model, eternity, because eternity is 
universal and time is its image. 
Descending from this consideration of God's eternity to mundane time, Augus-
tine wrestles, as we have seen, with the contradiction of being able to experience time 
but not explain it. This conundrum introduces the dimensions of psychology, the 
experience of time, and epistemology, the understanding of time, and through these 
secondary considerations Augustine arrives at the primary one, how time is, in and of 
itself. This he does beginning with the basically spatial metaphor of the locus or con-
tainer, in which time passes from the container of the future to the container of the 
present, and finally to the container of the past. These containers are the memory, in 
which the past resides, awareness, in which the present is, and anticipation, a kind of 
matrix where exists all that is to come.8 The spatial metaphor leads, however, to 
another conundrum, one derived from Parmenides, that of the non-existence of 
time: 
Of these three divisions of time, then, how can two, the past and the future, 
be, when the past no longer is and the future is not yet? As for the present, 
if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would 
not be time but eternity. If, therefore, the present is time only by reason of 
the fact that it moves on to become the past, how can we say that even the 
present is when the reason why it is is that it is not to bel· In other words, we 
cannot righdy say that time w, except by reason of its impending state of not 
being. (XI, 14) 
Through the reduction of the spatial metaphor to terms of measurement and dura-
tion, Augustine is able to engage time within the self, and to locate the reality of the 
past in the memory: "When we describe the past correcdy, it is not past facts that are 
drawn out of our memories but only words which are based on our memory-pictures 
\ verba concepta] of those facts" (XI, 18). While demurring from a claim to understand 
equally well how the future is known, Augustine nevertheless goes on to explain it in 
analogy with his explanation of the past: 
By whatever mysterious means it may be that the future is foreseen, it is 
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only possible to see something which exists; and whatever exists is not 
future but present. So when we speak of seeing the future, we do not see 
things which are not yet in being, that is, things which are future, but it 
may be that we see their causes or signs [eorum causae sed signa], which are 
already in being (XI, 18). 
We may note here two important manoeuvres in the development of a solution 
to the conundrum of time: Augustine moves the discussion from one sustained by 
the metaphor of space to one characterised by words and signs {verba concepta, 
signa) ; words and signs being mental events, time begins to manifest itself as an inte-
rior reality. This intériorisation then leads to the second manoeuvre, the shift from 
the logical arena, die origin of the conundrum, to the metaphysical arena; if time is 
truly an interior reality, Augustine seems to suggest, it inheres in the interior of 
human beings and is intimately involved in being's existence. His next step is to con-
centrate the existence of the three dimensions of time in the present, a step which 
makes possible both the existential reality of time and its unity. This realisation he 
articulates in a famous definition: 
It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past things, 
a present of present things, and a present of future things. Some such dif-
ferent times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The 
present of past things is the memory, the present of present things is direct 
perception, the present of future things is expectation (XI, 20). 
While such a definition goes a long way to unifying time as a concept, it still 
does not explain fully how the mind (animus) is able to comprehend the dimensions 
of time as unified in the present while simultaneously distinguishing the present of 
things past from the present of things future and both from the present of things 
present. The solution to this problem leads Augustine to a further perception of 
what time is, and the fact that he arrives at this realisation through a meditation on 
poetry is, perhaps, especially significant in a discussion of Chaucer's possible inspira-
tions. 
To begin to demonstrate how we can experience both the unity and diversity of 
time at one and the same moment, Augustine, as we have said, moves away from the 
spatial example—measuring yards by means of feet—and has recourse to the more 
abstract example of listening to verse: "We use the same method when we measure 
the length of a poem by the length of the lines, the length of the lines by the length 
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of the feet, the length of the feet by the length of the syllables." But, as he says, even 
this is inaccurate since such lengths are subject to variations; however, it is this inte-
riorised example that leads him to muse: "whether time is merely an extension ... 
whether it is an extension of the mind itself" (XI, 26). 
Through the analysis of the experience of listening to St Ambrose's hymn Deus 
Creator omnium, Augustine perceives in part the ontological nature of time. By com-
paring long syllables with short, the listener measures and realises the longness and 
shortness of them, but, as Augustine admits, he hears one before and one after the 
other, necessitating the retention of the first so as to compare it with the second, and 
the retention of both so as to compare them because they are passed before they can 
be measured: "I can only do this because they are both completed and are now things 
of the past. So it cannot be the syllables themselves that I measure, since they no 
longer exist. I must be measuring something which remains fixed in my memory. It 
is in my own mind, then, that I measure time" (XI, 27). 
The mind, therefore, draws from memory recollections of durations and com-
pares them to arrive at a certain understanding of time. That takes care of the func-
tion of memory in the act of comprehension, but what about the future; how is it 
that as one begins to recite a psalm or a poem that one already knows, the whole of it 
is somehow already present to the reciter before he actually utters it? This power 
Augustine calls "expectation" \expectatio\. The entire process of recitation is divided 
between the two operations of memory and expectation, "the one looking back to 
the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I 
have still to recite." The crucial consideration now suggests itself: "But my faculty of 
attention is present all the while, and through it passes what was die future in the 
process of becoming the past" (XI, 28). 
Augustine makes the first important breakthrough in his attempt to understand 
the aporia of time when he discovers at this point the concept of distentio. This is the 
global awareness of time, the ability of the mind to hold before it simultaneously 
past present and future and, while realising their difference, unite them into a single 
spiritual experience. Paul Ricoeur, whose inclusion of Augustinian time theory in his 
analysis of narrative affords a profound understanding of Augustine's thinking, takes 
this passage to be the "crown jewel" of the philosophy of time and perceives in it the 
essential relationship between intentio and distentio: 
The example of the song, which includes that of the sound that continues 
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and ceases and that of the long and short syllables, is here more than just a 
concrete application. It marks the point at which the theory of distentio is 
joined to that of the threefold present. The theory of the threefold present, 
reformulated in terms of the threefold intention, makes the distentio arise 
out of the intentio that has burst asunder.9 
At this point Augustine's original Latin is necessary to a clearer understanding 
of his definition of time and its many philosophical implications. Time, he states, is 
nothing other than a distentio of the soul (animus), and this "stretching out" of the 
human spirit or mind is a motion having its point of departure in the present aware-
ness (attentio) and going in two directions at once, toward the past through praeten-
tio of the spirit, toward the future through intentio of the spirit. Together these three 
"tendings" or "tendencies" comprise the "distention" of the human spirit that makes 
of time an existential, ontological reality: Nam [animus] et expectat et attendit et mem-
init (XI, 28). 
Distention, attention, and intention as the simultaneous acts of the soul makes 
possible the reality of time, and this reality in turn enacts the unity of knowing and 
being: the soul is one with that which it measures, and by the same token, time 
becomes one with that which measures it, the soul, thus progressing from that which 
is known to that which is. It is principally in this sense that Augustine's theory of time 
is a realist philosophy. 
In the chief example that Augustine uses, the "intention" of the intellect (ani-
mus) is its knowing constituted through its simultaneous awareness (attentio) of both 
past and future. In reciting a poem, Augustine's intention is first directed toward the 
entire text; then as the verses are spoken memory tends toward them, that is toward 
the beginning which is now past. This praeter-itio is, as its etymology shows, a 
stretching of intellect to what has "gone by" (-ire, to go) and (praeter-, before, in 
front of), a "placing before" the intellect that which has past. As Augustine specifies, 
the recitation in the example is of a poem already known. Thus the verses being spo-
ken and presently before the mind make possible an awareness of the verses not yet 
spoken and still to come; this is due, of course, to the rhythms and rhymes already 
established which direct the intellect toward that which is not yet in an in-tentio of 
the future. This expectation, as Augustine calls it, together with memory and present 
awareness constitutes the "distention" of intellect that reveals the reality of time. 
The example works equally well for the act of reading as for that of reciting. The 
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reader's "attention" is constant, always present, and through it is drawn what is future 
(waiting to be read) so as to become what is past (already read). The longer the 
action lasts, Augustine tells us, the more expectation is diminished and memory 
increased. This unifying/distinguishing dialectic of "distention" is explained by 
Ricoeur: 
The theme of this entire paragraph is the dialectic of expectation, memory, 
and attention, each considered no longer in isolation but in interaction with 
one another. It is thus no longer a question of impression-images or antici-
patory images but of an action that shortens expectation and extends mem-
ory.... The distentio is then nothing other than the shift in, the 
noncoincidence of the three modalities of action (I, 20). 
Augustine's use of the literary metaphor of poetic narrative provides an analogy to a 
series of other processes which, as it expands, explains more and more fully the onto-
logical nature of time and history. Thus narrative itself undergoes a "distension" to 
become one with that which it narrates in a way similar to Augustine's description of 
the intellect's becoming one with that which it measures. In this analysis, narrative 
becomes a dialectic of parts and whole, particular and universal: 
What is true of the whole psalm is also true of all its parts and of each sylla-
ble. It is true of any longer action in which I may be engaged and of which 
the recitation of the psalm may only be a small part. It is true of a man's 
whole life, of which all his actions are parts. It is true of the whole history 
of mankind, of which each man's life is a part (XI, 28). 
Augustinian intentionality is grounded in a metaphysics of philosophical realism. 
Robert Myles, in his study of Chaucer's realist vision, defines this as "intentionalist 
realism," a view which he describes as widely held in the Middle Ages and which was 
grounded in "the object-directedness of all being."10 This question of direction is, as 
Myles shows, what constitutes the realist nature of much medieval thought, and no 
more important an influence on the question than Augustine's meditations on inten-
tion can be found. Ricoeur, perceiving Augustine's non-reductive way of dealing 
with paradox, describes the evolution of the idea of intention in these meditations 
from a means for comprehending temporality to a transcendence of time and being 
to eternity and Being: 
Distentio animi no longer provides just the "solution" to the aporia of the 
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measurement of time. It now expresses the way in which the soul, deprived 
of the stillness of the eternal present, is torn asunder: "But to win your 
favor is dearer than life itself. I see now that my life has been wasted in dis-
tractions [distentio est vita mea]N (29:39). It is in fact the entire dialectic of 
intentio-distentio, a dialectic within time itself, that is taken up again in 
terms of the contrast between eternity and time. While the distentio 
becomes synonymous with the dispersal into the many and the wandering 
of the old Adam, the intentio tends to be identified with the fusion of the 
inner man (I, 27). 
Here Ricoeur cites the critical passage of the Confessions in which Augustine passes 
beyond the logical conundrums of time and by means of them turns toward tran-
scendence. This ultimate movement is signified by an expansion—one might say, in 
this context, an exaltation of the term intentio in which the "distension" of spirit in 
the world of matter that made possible the understanding of time and being*in-time 
becomes a bridge to the new "intention" of the soul toward its destiny in God: 
I look forward, not to what lies ahead of me in this life and will surely pass 
away, but to my eternal goal fsed in ea quae ante sunt non distentus sed exten-
tus\ I am intent [non secundum distentionem sed secundum intentionem] upon 
this one purpose, not distracted by other aims, and with this goal in view I 
press on, eager for the prize [palm am], Gods heavenly summons (XI, 29). 
Roland Teske, S.J., has closely examined the origin and meaning of the term distentio 
in Augustine's work. Pointing to its fundamentally negative sense in ancient medi-
cine, as a swelling, a distortion, and a deformation of the body, Teske reveals how 
Augustine prepares the reader for his turn away from distentio animi in time and 
toward intentio ad palmam of eternity. This rhetorical move we learn is also found in 
Plotinus' description of time as "distention" where the Greek word όιαστασις (dia-
stasis), although as in Augustine, initially used neutrally, carries the same negative 
potential. Augustine, claims Teske, realises this potential at the end of Book XI: 
"Here the state of distention is a state of being pulled apart into manyness away from 
God, the One, to whom we are being called and pulled back."11 
Augustine's debt to Plotinus in this analysis does not, Teske suggests, stop with 
the play on the word distentio. The Neoplatonic idea of a World Soul is also present 
in Augustine's discussion of time and eternity which he derived from Plotinus; it is 
through this universal concept that Augustine escapes the problem of the possible 
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radical subjectivity, or individualism, of his conception of time. What is important in 
this idea for the present discussion is the extreme realism involved in the theory of 
the World Soul which, if Teske is right, was imported into Augustine's philosophy of 
time along with many other influences from Plotinus: 
Toward the end of Enneads III, 7, Plotinus spells out, albeit somewhat 
cryptically, the relationship between this universal soul and individual souls. 
He asks, "How, then, is time everywhere?" And he answers, "Because Soul, 
too, is not absent from any part of the Universe, just as the soul in us is not 
absent from any part of us." He also asks, "Is time, then, also in us?" His 
answer makes it clear that time is in every human soul (p. 47). 
In Teske's analysis we see another manifestation of the basic Neoplatonic realism of 
Augustine's theory of time and intentionality, one which, it is suggested, we also find 
in Chaucer. 
T h e personifications of time also preserved time's tripartite nature while expressing 
it in such a way as to indicate its potential transcendence. The very etymology of the 
word prudentia invited the association of the virtue of prudence with die concept of 
time, and the personification of the concept in terms of vision followed naturally. A 
contraction derived from Providentia, the word is constituted by the verb "to see" 
(videre) and the preposition "before" (pro), having the general sense of "foresight." 
That the personification of Prudence attributes to her three eyes suggests the com-
monplace idea that the true understanding of the future is made possible through the 
true comprehension of past and present. 
This sense of the interdependency of time's phases is clearly present, although 
lacking personification, in the Pseudo-Seneca of Martinus Dum tens is, known to 
Chaucer through Albertanus Brixiensis' Liber Consolationis et Consilii: 
So that you may carefully examine and prudendy conduct matters "intend 
your gaze to the future and, thus your spirit reaching out, the whole will be 
displayed before it." And not only future time, but toward the past as well 
you must intend. For as Seneca has said in his De Formula Honestae Vitae, 
"if you are truly prudent, your spirit will be stretched out to embrace the 
three modes of time: order the present, foresee the future, and remember 
the past, for whoever knows nothing of the past will perish, while he who 
cannot reflect upon the future into all kinds of traps will be ensnared. Dis-
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play before your spirit, therefore, both the good and evil that the future 
holds so that you may endure it and be in control."12 
This description of Prudence echoes Cicero, who also refrained from personification 
but who conceptualises the virtue as a tripartite entity: "Prudence is the understand-
ing of those things which are good, those that are evil, and those that are neither. Its 
parts are memory, awareness, and foresight."13 Hie idea that Prudence is constituted 
by parts which make up a whole, and that this whole is a psychological and intellec-
tual experience of time, brings us closer to the medieval figure of Prudence and the 
Augustinian formulation of time which I claim Chaucer combines in Twilus and Cri-
seyde. The vehicle is likely to have been Dante who, both in the Convmo and in the 
Commedia, describes Prudence; the description in the former is abstract and echoes 
Cicero: One should therefore be prudent (that is, wise), and being wise requires 
having a good memory of past experience, a good knowledge of the present, and 
good foresight of the future."14 
In the Commedia, however, the personified figure is fully and dramatically 
present; describing the chariot (representing the Church) drawn by the gryphon 
(representing Christ), Dante depicts four maidens in attendance who represent the 
four cardinal virtues. Their leader is Prudence: 
To the left four made festive, 
In purple dressed, following behind 
One of their group who had three eyes in her head.15 
One of the most dramatic visual representations of the same idea comes much later 
than Dante and Chaucer in the sixteenth-century depiction of Prudence by Titian 
consisting of three fused male heads—a youth, a bearded adult, and an old man 
superimposed upon a tricephalic animal—a wolfs head, representing the past; a 
lion's head, representing the present; a dog's head, representing the future. Under-
neath the heads is a tripartite inscription, each phrase corresponding to the head 
above: Ex praeterito /praesensprudenter agit / ni juturam actionem deturpet.16 
The inhering of the dimensions of time in this single, tricephalic figure of Pru-
dence expresses two essential concepts. On the one hand it communicates the univer-
sality of time, the individual or particular moments of which are subsumed into a 
general or universal reality. On the other hand, it expresses the primary ontological 
nature of time which precedes and supersedes its secondary logical sense. This seems 
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to be the very sense that Augustine arrives at through his analysis of time in narra-
tive: 
What is true of the whole psalm is also true of all its parts and of each sylla-
ble. It is true of any longer action in which I may be engaged and of which 
the recitation of the psalm may only be a small part. It is true of a man's 
whole life, of which all his actions are parts. It is true of the whole history 
of mankind, of which each man's life is a part (XI, 28). 
Less than a hundred years after Chaucer had Criseyde bemoan the lack of a third 
eye, Marsilio F kino employed the same metaphor but did so in a way that reveals 
more overtly the conceptual origin of the figure: "Among the wisest men of Greece 
arose the saying that Plato had three eyes: one with which he looked at human 
things, another at natural things, and another at divine things. The last was in his 
forehead while the other two were under his forehead."17 
As may be easily perceived, this ancient saying direcdy connects the triocular 
image with philosophical realism. The fact that it is Plato to whom three eyes are 
attributed obviously associates the metaphor of triple vision with Platon ism as well 
as with its founder. The superior location of the third eye, "higher up" than the natu-
ral position of the other two, further suggests that what is seen with it is, as well, 
"higher up;" this is precisely what Ficino articulates in his analysis of the metaphor. 
What are those "divine things" gazed upon by this supranatural eye? Michael Allen 
answers: 
Ficino has just been discussing the theory of Platonic Ideas and affirming 
their existence over against such ancient sceptics as Aristophanes, Diogenes 
the Cynic, and Aristode. He concludes that: "the universal object of the 
intelligence must be more true and exist more absolutely than sensible 
objects to the degree that the intellect is superior to the sense. The objects 
of the intellect are the rules by which you may distinguish between die 
truth and falsity of sensible objects, and recognise the defects of existence. 
Therefore they exist and exist more truly and absolutely than all else" (VII, 
171). 
As Allen goes on to point out, the rules referred to here are the Ideas perceptible by 
intellect alone, and thus the third eye is a symbol of intellect itself. Although cogni-
tion is involved in all three perceptions, the third eye represents pure intellectual per-
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ception; whereas in the triocular metaphor one eye perceives the particular 
embodiments of forms in material nature, and the second perceives human con-
structs, including logical predications, the superior eye beholds universals and makes 
possible a true understanding of particulars through them. 
Allen has traced the origin of the figure of Plato's third eye in Ficino to a couple 
of possible sources; one of them, a sixth-century collection of prolegomena to Pla-
tonic studies, renders the anecdote this way: "It is said, in fact, that having found the 
theory of ideas he dreamt he had a third eye" (VII, 172). The same source explains 
that while Pythagoras before Plato, and Aristotle after him, considered Ideas to exist 
in the efficient cause (that is to say, that universals exist in particulars), Plato under-
stood them to exist in the exemplary cause. As Allen explains, the exemplary cause 
was conceived of as a kind of mean between the formal cause, which Ficino like his 
medieval predecessors would have identified as die One or God, and the efficient 
cause, understood to be material. In this realist analysis of causality particulars, pro-
duced by material, efficient causes, are derived from exemplary causes—universals 
that exist as Ideas in the mind of God who Himself is die formal, final cause of all. 
The second ancient reference to Plato's third eye occurs in a more polemical 
context where it is used to refute the charges leveled against Christians of indulging 
in fairy tales; speaking of fairy tales, thunders Origen in his Contra Celsum, we can 
level the same charge against Plato about whom all kinds of fantastic fables abound, 
and none more fantastic than the story of "the third eye that Plato prided himself on 
possessing" (VII, 172). According to Allen, implied in the metaphor of the three 
eyes is the "triple division of philosophy into physics, ethics (including politics), and 
metaphysics (i.e. theology), the philosopher looking downwards for the first, out-
wards and inwards equally for the second, and upwards for the third" (VII, 173). 
The directional sense of the metaphor links it with Augustine's temporal triad of 
praetentio, attentio, intentio in which we look back to the past, forward to the future, 
and in front of us to the present. The two uses are further linked at a deeper level, for 
both point to unify through multiplicity. Just as Augustine's synthesis of time's 
dimensions into an existential Now points to eternity in the One, in the same way 
the metaphor of Plato's three eyes connotes unity through multiplicity. Again, Allen 
points out that Plato was admired precisely for his genius in having united the three 
parts of philosophy—natural philosophy, logic and ethics, and metaphysics—and 
having incarnated, as it were, the wisdom of his predecessors in such a way as to sug-
gest a philosophical trinity of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. Ficino extends this 
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hypostasis in an interesting way: "We can therefore speak as if in a way the genius in 
Pythagoras and in Socrates were only divine, the genius in Aristode and the other 
philosophers succeeding Plato only human, but the genius in Plato himself divine 
and human equally/18 
Plato alone, according to his admirers, united all aspects of human understand-
ing, the physical, the moral, and the metaphysical, a wholeness that Platonic realism 
makes possible. Allen's historical analysis of the figure of three eyes makes clear that 
the image was meant to communicate the extraordinary synthesis of philosophy and 
human wisdom achieved by Plato, and his identification of each of the eyes may 
recall for us Chaucer's use of the figure to encapsulate Criseyde's dilemma and Troy's 
catastrophe: "If the first eye is die Heraclitian eye of sense perception and the second 
the Socratic eye of discursive reason, the third is the Pythagorean eye of the intuitive 
intellect"19 
It is possible, then, to perceive the series of analogies between the triads we have 
been discussing. In Augustine the operative triad is initially past/present/future; it in 
turn yields the triple mental structure of memory/awareness/expectation; intellectu-
ally this is expressed as praeteritio/attentio/intentio. In Marsilio Ficino the triad is first 
expressed as the natural/the human/the divine, then as efficient cause/exemplary 
cause/formal cause; lasdy in Ficino the triad seems to imply three increasingly fuller 
forms of understanding, sense perception/logical discourse/intuitive intellection (or 
abstraction). In Chaucer's use of the image of three-eyed Prudence the presence of 
these other triads may be gleaned, if not by Criseyde, at least by the attentive audi-
ence. Criseyde employs the figure to express her understanding of time in its mate-
rial, particular, fragmented manifestations, mistakenly attributing her woes to an 
inability to understand one of these fragments. 
. In order for the two images to have echoed the same philosophical meaning, it 
is not necessary for Chaucer to have associated the three eyes of Prudence with 
Plato's, although the anecdotal nature of the story and Origen's view that it and other 
stories about Plato were widespread make that quite possible. Inherent in the figure 
of triocularity is the idea of transcendent intentionality, be it in Augustine's transcen-
dence of the fragmentation of time into past, present, and future, or Plato's rising 
above particulars and efficient causes to universals and exemplary causes, or Cri-
seyde's failure to develop the inner life that, as Boethius taught, allows one to rise 
above the determinism of the past. 
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In Book Π of Troilus and Criseyde the poet presents Criseyde in a tableau consti-
tuted by the act of reading; she is listening to the recitation of her own historical past 
as contained in the geste of the siege of Thebes. Such an introduction augurs well 
because Thebes is the immediate mythical and historical moment that precedes Troy 
and in its moral turmoil arc sewn the seeds of Troy's own tragic history. Thebes is 
the mythico-historic past and the context of Troy, while Troy is the present and the 
context for Criseyde's personal history. That she is "reading" her past encourages the 
expectation that through an understanding of the past she will be able to avoid its 
errors, enacting its virtues and eschewing its vices, and thus break the tragic force 
that has destroyed civilisations and the individuals who constituted them since the 
Garden of Eden. Witnessing this measured act of reading by this particular reader of 
her own larger history, we may recall Augustine's analogy, quoted above, between 
the measured verses of the narrative, the duration of an individual's life, and die 
whole history of mankind. 
But, as we know, Criseyde's reading is interrupted before she has got very far, 
and given that there is no further reference to the romance of Thebes, we suspect 
that she never finishes her study of the past. This lends a certain irony to her later 
invocation of three-eyed time to excuse her failure to understand the nature of 
things. Recalling that we earlier saw her giving in to Pandarus' insistence to "do wey 
youre book" (II, 111), the audience has reason to doubt that Criseyde "on tyme 
ypassed wel remembred" (V, 746). There is also the further irony that this progeny 
of Calkas—the /fret devyn who knew all about things to come—should lack, of all 
things, foreknowledge. 
The far greater irony inherent in Criseyde's lament, one which trumps all others, 
is the tragic mistaking of the nature of time and intention that she reveals, a misun-
derstanding that conceives of time as consisting in discrete, individual, and fractured 
dimensions of past, present, and future. It is exacdy this "pagan" misunderstanding 
that Augustine tackles in the Confessions when he cites interrogatively the ancient par-
adox of the nonexistence of time, asking "How can two, the past and the future, be, 
when the past no longer is and the future is not yet? As for the present, if it were 
always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but 
eternity" (XI, 14). 
It is clear from Robert Myles* examination that the essence of the intentio, both 
in medieval and modern thought, inheres in the idea of direction toward: 
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In classical Latin, intendere, in addition to the senses of "to stretch" and "to 
strain" meant "to aim weapons" such as arrows. The image of the archer 
nicely contains the idea of directedness: "object-directedness" controlled by 
the will of the "object-director" (p. 34). 
In Augustine, as we have seen, it is the "intention" of the human spirit that directs the 
self outward to an understanding of the past and outward in another direction to an 
understanding of the future, and still further outward to a comprehensive under-
standing of time, self, eternity, and God. Criseyde, however, as we see from the 
beginning of the text, has no outward direction, just as she has no unified under-
standing of time. It is this lack of directedness that makes her "starf for feere / So as 
she was the ferfulleste wight / That myghte be" (II, 449-51). Nor does she have 
inner substance. Her response to Pandarus' erotic proposition does not arise from 
moral principle firmly established within, but from crude considerations of banal, 
external exigencies: her reputation (II, 738), her material welfare (II, 706), her social 
position (II, 707), and a fear of gossip so great as to suggest the schizophrenic: 
How bisy, if I love, ek most I be 
To plesen hem that jangle of love, and dremen, 
And coye hem, that they seye noon harm of me! 
For though ther be no cause, yet hem semen 
Al be for harm that folk hire frendes quemen; 
And who may stoppen every wikked tonge, 
Or sown of belles whil thei ben ronge? (II, 799-805) 
True, the self looms large in Criseyde's preoccupations, but she lacks an inner life and 
is thus made a prisoner of fear, enclosed within a self that has, paradoxically, no sense 
of self. Criseyde's lack of philosophical intentio (Myles' object-directedness) is shown 
throughout the poem in her lack of guiding values and in her inability to solve the 
problem of the decision to exchange her for Antenor, as we see in her inability to 
construct a realistic plan to return to Troilus. She lives wholly in the present instant, 
consumed with fending off the immediate dangers that she believes threaten her 
security. Thus she becomes trapped in the present with no direction forward. Her 
lack of intentio (object-directedness) parallels exacdy her lack of psychological distentio 
(object-director), as shown in her misunderstanding of time. It is finally the absence of 
both of these directional powers that reveals her lack of the ultimate intentio of which 
Augustine speaks and that deprives her of that "prize of a higher calling" (patmam 
mpernae vocationis XI, 29). 
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The scene in which Criseyde listens to a reading of the history of Thebes is one 
of the major dramatisations of the theme of time in the poem, and it provides a basic 
structural element of the poem since just as Chaucer's audience, the medieval listen-
ers in England or ourselves, are "reading" their own cultural past in the text of Troilus 
and Criseyde, so, too, Criseyde is encountering her own history in the Roman de 
Thebes, past history which for her, as for us, provides the existential context of our 
presents. Criseyde's serving as an audience thus functions as a paradigm for audiences 
in general, a paradigm through which we will see reading go right or go wrong. 
Criseyde's reading goes wrong when Pandarus urges her to pay exclusive atten-
tion to the present, inviting her to "do wey youre book, rys up, and lat us daunce," 
urging her to "shew youre face bare" (Π, 110-11), and employing every trick to draw 
her away from the past to the now of "present joys." Pandarus' success in manipulat-
ing both Criseyde and Troilus is attributable to his skill with words, as virtually all 
commentators on the poem have observed. In the more recent discussion of Chau-
cer's place in the nominalist/realist debate, several commentators have identified Pan-
darus as a figure of nominalism humorously satirised by Chaucer through his 
exaggeration of the powers of language.20 
Many elements of the text support this view, especially the extensive treatment 
of the subject of language itself through the attitude toward "words" expressed by 
Pandarus. Less often noted is Criseyde's view of the relation of language to reality, 
and yet she has much to say on the subject. She sees through Pandarus' sophistical 
use of words, demonstrated by her matching of his deceptive rhetoric with her own 
as she tries to get him to tell her the secret he is withholding in their first meeting in 
Book II: 
Tho gan she wondren moore than biforn 
A thousand fold, and down hire eyghen caste; 
For nevere, sith the tyme that she was born, 
To know thyng desired she so faste; 
And with a syk she seyde hym atte laste, 
"Now, uncle myn, I nyl yow nought displese, 
Nor axen more that may do yow disese" (141-47). 
Pandarus is mistaken in his opinion that Criseyde is "tender witted" and that because 
of her stupidity he can "hire in [my] wil bigyle" (II, 270-71). Criseyde again sees 
through the rhetorical web of words that Pandarus weaves, which she makes plain 
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when she has finally learned Pandarus' intent: I s al this paynted procès seyd, alias!" 
(Π, 424). She demonstrates her own rhetorical astuteness once again in her accusa-
tions after the sexual consummation of Pandarus' plot: 
"God help me so, ye caused al this fare 
Trowe I," quod she, "for al youre wordes white. 
O, whoso seeth yow knoweth yow fill lite" (III, 1566-68). 
Pandarus has, of course, succeeded in manipulating Criseyde, not because she is 
weak-witted, but rather because she is weak-willed, and this lack of intentio voluntatis 
leaves her morally feeble. Criseyde has been complicit in her own duping from the 
beginning and has conspired with her nominalist uncle to construct love through 
words. We see her throughout the interior monologue of Book Π "talking herself 
into loving Troilus: 
What shal I doon? To what fyn lyve I thus? 
Shal I η at love, in cas if that me leste? 
What, pardieux, I am naught religious. 
And though that I myn herte sette at reste 
Upon this knyght, that is the worthieste, 
And kepe alwey myn honour and my name, 
By alle right, it may do me no shame (II, 757-63).21 
The prohemium that introduces Book II presents an entirely opposite theory of the 
relation of language and reality, specifically the reality of love: 
Ye knowe ek that in forme of speche is chaunge 
Withinne a thousand yeer, and wordes tho 
That hadden pris, now wonder nyce and straunge 
Us thinketh hem, and yet thei spake hem so, 
And spedde as wel in love as men now do (Π, 22-26). 
Robert Myles has cited this passage as evidence of Chaucer's realism: 
The passage from Troilus and Criseyde asserts the view that that which lan-
guage intends, names, reveals, and may even evoke actually precedes lan-
guage: in this case "love" ... Chaucer, like Dante and Augustine, is a realist 
who believes not only that extramental reality precedes language, but also 
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that extra-subjective reality can be named, revealed by language, and known 
to some degree by the human subject (p. 14). 
Criseyde's apparent opinion that reality is constructed by man through language is 
expressed not only through her analyses of the all-too-human discourse of Pandarus, 
or her calculations about the advantages and disadvantages of love, but also through 
her ventures into metaphysics. The "language of the gods," suggestive of the Ideas 
that Plato perceived with his third eye, is just a lot of wishful thinking as far as Cri-
seyde is concerned, fairy tales made up by men out of fear of death: 
For goddes speken in amphibologies, 
And, for ο soth, they teilen twenty lyes. 
Ek, T>rede fond first goddes, I suppose' (IV, 1406-8) 
And so we see, Criseyde has no time for theology, this science of first intentions. 
Like her uncle, she puts her confidence in human discourse and the logic it yields; 
indeed, her trust in words is so deep that she contends that it is human discourse that 
invented the divine, not the other way round, words that sired Word, we might 
say—a view that has much to do with her final myopia. 
In the attempts to explain her perspective, not enough has been made of Cri-
seyde's genetic background. She is in many ways a true "chip off the old block:" the 
progeny of a prophet who sees the future and betrays the present, niece of a nomi-
nalist dialectician who verbally constructs the present and destroys the future. Cri-
seyde herself ignores the past and thereby deforms the present. In each of the three 
family members we see a distortion of aspects of time brought on by a spiritual 
blindness that renders each of them monocular. 
Criseyde's failure, like her father's and her uncle's, begins as one of distentio, that 
power of mind that integrates the fragments of the experience of time within a living 
human being who, by the very power of intellectual distentio, rises above the mutabil-
ity of words and world to a spiritual intentio toward the eternal. She is mistaken in 
her claim that she has understood the past correcdy, and Chaucer prepares us to see 
that error in the scene of the interruption of her reading. She is also wrong about the 
depth with which she perceived the nature of present time, for she has made all the 
wrong choices, guided by her uncle, in terms both of her true self-interest, her sum-
mum bonum, and that of Troilus. But the cause and origin of these errors is most 
clearly reflected in her profound misunderstanding of the very metaphor she herself 
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employs, for she implies that it is possible fully to understand the past and the 
present without understanding the future; that is, that one can understand time in its 
fragments. This is, of course, the view of those who, according to Boethius, are 
caught up in the mutability of passing things and fleeting moments, who lack the 
inner life that Lady Philosophy teaches and the serenity needed to sustain it. It is not 
the future that such people fail to understand, for Calkas understood Troy's future 
and still fell short; it is the nature of time as the vestige of eternity that is not grasped, 
just as the universal absolutes that lie behind particular experiences and truths of 
one's narrative are not grasped, and in this sense the failure is ultimately one of inten-
tio. 
Criseyde's failure may also be seen through the metaphor of reading that Chau-
cer has established in Book II. Just as Augustine used the experience of reciting a 
narrative to explain how we comprehend time, so Chaucer uses the experience of 
interrupted narrative to explain how Criseyde does not comprehend time. Adapting 
the Augustinian metaphor, we may see reading as beginning when the reader holds 
in mind the part of the narrative already read, a "pre-tending" back through the early 
verses or chapters, while "attending" to the action of the narrative before him. The 
reader's "intention" is toward the end, the completion of the elements of die story 
that he is reading and has already read. The reader's overall comprehension, his pos-
session of the text, occurs when he sees the beginning of the text in its ending and 
the ending in its beginning. This "distention" of the reading mind makes of the narra-
tive a unified whole, and, like Prudence, the reader "sees" the text all at once, or as in 
the figure, with three eyes. 
In a still wider extension of the metaphor, the text begins when the author 
"pre-tends" the story, just as Chaucer has "gone back" {praeter-ire/itum ) to the events 
of ancient Troy for his tale. The ontology of the text continues when it is read since 
the "attention" of the audience acts as a catalyst for meaning. Finally, with the union 
of authorial "pretending" and audience "attending," the text is complete, and both 
author and audience share the final "intention" that is the meaning of the text. This 
meaning expands with every reading of the text, with every new audience reading 
with "good entente," as Chaucer enjoins, but it never excludes authorial intention; it 
never replaces the text with its own narcissism. 
The paradigm of this kind of literature is allegory in which die very structure of 
the narrative is based on the typological anticipation of the end in the beginning and 
the fulfillment of the beginning in the end. In this way allegory exemplifies the idea 
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of the transcendence of time, diluting the linearity of its narrative while unifying its 
parts in the anagogy of its meaning. Sheila Delany is correct, I believe, in suggesting 
allegory as the literary expression of philosophical realism; its form is a constant 
expression of the reality of universals. She is not correct, I think, in describing Chau-
cer as a poet who had outgrown allegory and who inaugurated an almost modern 
mimesis of the world as it is and an almost postmodern relativist fashioning of the 
world as we would desire it to be.22 
The kind of one-to-one correspondence that we find in Prudentius is not, to be 
sure, the type of allegory that Chaucer writes, but it is not necessary that narratives to 
be allegorical must lack a convincing literal level or that their characters be deprived 
of individuality or the ability to exercise will. Regarding the universe as contingent is 
not typical of the "poetics of scepticism," nor is it the signature of nominalism, since 
virtually every Christian poet and thinker understood the contingency of this world 
and for that very reason strove toward the intentio of spirit that would lead beyond iL 
The foreshadowing of Troy's doom in Thebes' history and the possible mirroring of 
the drama of Eden in both, are part of what makes the structure of Troilus and Cri-
seyde allegorical; Troilus as a microcosm of Troy, Pandarus as devilish word-mer-
chant, and Criseyde as a myopic Helen-Eve are not developed at the expense of the 
integrity of plot or the individual memorableness of the characters. It is precisely in 
his ability to create vivid characters who, while individual, are nevertheless universal, 
and narratives which, while realistic, are nevertheless symbolic, that Chaucer is 
honoured for creating "best sentence and most solas" (CT, 7981). 
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